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Article 9

In everyday usage, “impersonality”
denotes an absence of personality,
often figured as a machinelike or
robotic manner, such as the impersonality of customer service callcenter operators. It also refers to
Impersonality: Seven Essays by
something that is not particularSharon Cameron. Chicago:
ized, not connected to specific indiUniversity of Chicago Press, 2007.
viduals but dispersed more generPp. 272. $65.00 cloth. $25.00 paper.
ally, suggesting disinterestedness.
The Oxford English Dictionary emphasizes this set of meanings, which
describes a person who is not acting
like a person. In Impersonality, on
the other hand, Sharon Cameron
presses hard on the texts under
examination to elucidate another,
more radical sense of the word. In
each of the seven essays, impersonality denotes not just a person who
is not acting like a person, but the
erasure of the “personal”: the effort
to eradicate persons entirely. For
most of the authors in this study, the
payoff of such effort is enlightenment, variously defined. Radical
impersonality shares features with
the nonhuman and the inanimate,
but as Cameron is continually at
pains to demonstrate, the boundaries between these categories become
themselves unstable and permeable.
Once one takes seriously the concept of “impersonality” as more
than just a descriptive term for abnormal behavior and makes it an
end in itself, it ruptures all other
categories that depend on the stability of the personal.
This essay collection is undeniably challenging, but it amply rewards the reader’s investment.
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Cameron’s close readings are stunning in their precision and penetration. Moreover, her consideration
of the ethical stakes of the texts is
exemplary, as she strikes a careful
balance between generous reading
and conscientious interrogation. Each
essay focuses on one author: William Empson, Jonathan Edwards,
Ralph Waldo Emerson (who is the
subject of two essays), Simone
Weil, T. S. Eliot, and Herman Melville. Although there are resonances
among these authors’ representations of impersonality, each formulates it differently, and each has a
different view of whether and
how it can be achieved. Cameron’s
analysis of these multifarious understandings has broad-ranging implications, particularly for the study of
nineteenth-century American literature. While reading the book,
additional authors leaped to mind—
Emily Dickinson, Edgar Allan Poe,
Frederick Douglass—whose texts
would complement or complicate
Cameron’s analysis.
Impersonality is a departure from
Cameron’s earlier monographs on
nineteenth-century American authors such as Dickinson, Melville,
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Thoreau, and Henry James. In those
studies, Cameron limited her data
set to a single author—or a pair, in the
case of Melville and Hawthorne—in
order to anchor her investigations
of such vast and abstract concepts as
“time” and “thinking.” This circumscription resulted in a deep, thorough, complex engagement with

her material. Treating a similarly
vast concept in the new book, Cameron comes at it obliquely and partially, treating a range of authors
from different times and places. It is
not a tradeoff between depth and
superficiality, certainly, as Cameron
is as rigorous and nuanced as ever.
Yet the collection lacks the synthesis
that characterizes Cameron’s previous book-length studies. Cameron repeatedly acknowledges this
difference in her preface, calling her
essays “provisional” (xvii) and conceding that the various genres of the
texts “invite different kinds of consideration” (xv). Rather than taking
that insight as a prompt to a systematic approach that contemplates the
limits or conditions that genre places
on representations of impersonality,
Cameron uses it to excuse herself
from comparative analysis of the
authors at hand. This lack of an
overarching argument is merely a
disappointment, given the impressive powers of synthesis on display
in Cameron’s earlier work, but the
lack of reflection on exclusions that
her selection criteria permit is a more
serious weakness, one to which I
shall return.
Chapter 1, which also serves as
an introduction, treats Empson’s
fascination with the asymmetrical
faces of Buddha statues. Empson
argued that Buddha faces reconciled seemingly incompatible opposites, such as “complete repose” and
“an active power to help the worshipper,” by separating these attributes onto either side of the face.

ON SHARON CAMERON’S IMPERSONALITY
Cameron contrasts Empson’s positive view that impersonality can arise
from a unity of contradictions with
the recognition articulated by the
other five authors she treats, each of
whom dwells on the costs of impersonality. There is no sense of violence or loss in the achievement of
impersonality in Buddha faces; after all, Empson is analyzing images
of a divine being, not a person. This
counterexample underscores the
pathos embedded in the writing
Cameron examines in the remainder of the book, as persons struggle
with the fact that “impersonality (as
a practice, as an ethic, as a representation), since it is undertaken by
persons, could only be contradictory
by definition” (7). This contradiction takes a toll on persons who
“surrender” to “a force that effaces
what individuates them” (12); specifying the effects of that toll on various authors is Cameron’s aim in the
following six essays.
In chapter 2 Cameron argues
that Edwards differs from Empson,
Emerson, Weil, and Eliot (Melville
is a special case) in rejecting the
possibility that persons can achieve
impersonality—even fleetingly and
as a result of rigorous training. Edwards’s last work, The Nature of
True Virtue, closes off this possibility, which had remained open in his
earlier works. For Edwards, “true
virtue” consists in ideal love, in which
one loves things impartially according to the degree of being they possess, rather than according to their
relationship to oneself. Cameron

329

claims that Edwards makes this
impersonal love, which is intuitive
for God, categorically impossible
for persons because it would always be based on calculations performed within a self-interested
frame of reference.
The first of two essays on Emerson is a brilliant reading of “Experience,” yet it is only tangentially
related to impersonality. Cameron
argues that “Experience” enacts the
recognition that a particularized,
individual experience (grief at the
death of a son) is equivalent to all
experience, and that both are defined by dissociation. Emerson resists this impersonal grief by refusing
to mourn Waldo, his son, directly;
instead, he pushes his personal grief
over Waldo’s death to the margins
of the essay so as to “preserve what
is dismissed from anything that
might threaten it—specifically . . .
to empower the grief that the essay
has marginalized” (78). The “triumph” (78) of the personal over the
impersonal in this essay is at odds
with the overwhelming force of the
impersonal in the other essays in
Cameron’s collection.
Cameron argues in chapter 4 that
Emerson’s essays dramatize the
transformation of the personal into
the impersonal, a transformation
that Emerson calls “ravishment.”
In most of his essays, Emerson constructs an impersonal voice that
lacks embodiment or individuality,
whose source is unrecognizable, and
whose contradictory propositions
preclude summary. “The Poet” is a
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telling exception because ravishment
does not occur; the person who calls
the poet into existence is visible as a
person and does not transform into
the poet, who would be impersonal.
“The Poet” is thus a productive failure for Cameron, since it illuminates the problem at the core of the
other essays, a problem critics have
previously formulated in terms of
Emerson’s ethical failure. While
ravishment, in its dual meaning of
violation and rapture, implies an
intense mixture of pain and pleasure
at the moment of transformation,
the impersonal voice represents only
the nondifferentiated serenity that
follows the annihilation of the person. Since there is never a person—
except in “The Poet”—for the
ravishment to happen to, there is
never a convincing representation
of that ravishment, which is ostensibly the goal of the essays. The impersonal voice, with its utter lack of
ambivalence about the destruction
of the person, cannot speak for any
person, and thus, ultimately, cannot
speak to any person.
In contrast to Emerson’s disregard for the costs of impersonality,
Weil was minutely aware of the violence that self-annihilation exacts
on the person. In chapter 5 Cameron elaborates Weil’s theory that
attention constitutes real being. Attention is a practice that strips away
the illusions of will, personal point
of view, motive, even basic discrimination, until being becomes simply
interminable waiting, without object and without hope. In the latter

part of the essay, Cameron meditates
on Weil’s death from starvation,
positing that the extremity of Weil’s
commitment to attention seems to
necessitate a commitment to death.
The sixth chapter, on Eliot’s Four
Quartets, also centers on the representation of death, but Eliot blurs
the line between the living and the
dead. This effacement of distinction
permeates the entire poem, eroding
any sense of individual identity. Returning to the Buddhist doctrine
that being is momentary, not continuous, Cameron argues that Eliot
extends this insight to experience.
Making “experience” independent
of “persons who experience,” Eliot
depicts phenomena as unbound and
mobile.
The final chapter, on Melville’s
Billy Budd, is the clearest and most
systematic account of impersonality
in the collection. This clarity might
derive from the fact that Cameron’s
analysis here focuses on fictional
character, already a category not
equivalent to person, whereas elsewhere in the collection she examines
examples of genres—essays, notebooks, and lyric poetry—that are
traditionally presumed to give access
to an authorial subjectivity. First,
Cameron shows how characters
who seem to be opposites, such as
Claggart and Billy, reveal that differentiation cannot be sustained,
thus destabilizing the very concept
of character. More radically, Cameron demonstrates that characters
share features with entities in the
non-characterological realm, such

ON SHARON CAMERON’S IMPERSONALITY
as light and stones. This latter insight
collapses any distinction between
persons and other phenomena. The
violence of this version of impersonality is not legible on the surface
of the writing, in Melville’s elegant,
seductive prose, but rather in the
shocking imperative Melville places
on his reader to accept the radical
erasure of categories without the
promise of any consolatory enlightenment.
While most of the authors included in Impersonality are American, traditional organizing rubrics
of geography and time period are
incidental to Cameron, who instead
emphasizes a qualitative component
to her principle of inclusion. She
chose to study these six authors because of the “uncompromising nature of [their] writing” (viii), the
“intensity of their engagement with
this topic” (vii), and their “resistance
to impersonality” (xvi). The value
system encoded in those descriptors—
uncompromising, intense, resistant—
reveals a problem with the collection.
Cameron’s narrow focus on authors whose main concerns are
spiritual or philosophical excludes
instantiations of impersonality that
might complicate her emphasis on
the individual. Although Cameron
occasionally raises issues of the social, her selection criteria have excluded, almost by definition, writers
who negotiate the compromises
necessary for the social world. Moreover, Cameron does not engage
with the sense of impersonality
that arises in relation to masses of
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persons—the impersonality of the
mob, for example. This omission is
all the more surprising given her
stress on violence; the impersonal
mob’s proclivity to violence in Poe’s
or Baudelaire’s imaginations literalizes the metaphorical violence
that Cameron elucidates in Edwards or Emerson. These counterexamples invert the representations
of impersonality that Cameron
traces, as Poe, for example, portrays the submission of individual
will to mob rule as pleasurable (in a
brutish, sensual way) and spontaneous rather than an arduous sacrifice requiring extensive training.
Further, while Cameron treats
bondage and freedom as religious
concepts in her essay on Weil, she
never addresses the material reality of chattel slavery in the United
States. Although the texts Cameron discusses celebrate the permeability of the boundary between
human and nonhuman as a source
of philosophical and intellectual
pleasure, sometimes even as an idea
that promises an end to personal
suffering, many slave narratives
worked to reinscribe those divisions and to reject proslavery ideologies that would blur the
distinction between enslaved persons and animals. The “resistance”
Cameron observes in her authors—
their recognition that, to a person,
impersonality feels like a loss—
pales in comparison to the urgency
of Douglass’s resistance, for example. Joan Dayan and Maurice Lee,
whose work overlaps with many
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of Cameron’s concerns, offer examples of a more historically
grounded philosophical criticism,
attuned to the social ramifications
of abstractions. Eschewing a conclusion to the disparate essays,
Cameron never reflects on her decision to include only privileged
authors who are free to contemplate and practice the types of radical impersonality that, whatever
their psychic cost, nevertheless are
sought by the practitioner.
—University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill

